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ABSTRACT.
Identity politics was significant in 2019 Indonesian general elections. The result of the election however, seems to 
show that identity was only significant in presidential but not in legislative election. Given that the legislative and 
presidential elections are conducted concurrently, it is logical to assume that what is significant in the presidential 
election will also be significant for the legislative election. This paper tries to briefly answer several questions. Is 
identity politics really rising? Why does it seem to be significant only in the presidential and not the legislative 
election? If identity politics in the presidential election is important, assuming that the incumbent is mostly 
the target of that politics, why did the incumbent still win? What are the implications of this for Indonesian 
democracy? Data of the study were taken from the Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) and the 
Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) surveys and exit poll. Theoretical guidance for the discussion will be mainly 
based on the voting behavior and identity politics literature. The study indicates that identity politics was rising 
and significantly in play during this election, including by using fake news. However, the impact of identity 
politics is limited by the fundamental factors (such as public evaluation on the incumbent), making it fail to be a 
deciding factor in presidential election. Importantly, the multipolar nature of competition in legislative election 
made identity politics difficult to exert decisive effect.
Key words: fake news; fundamental factors; identity politics
ABSTRAK.
Politik identitas terlihat signifikan dalam Pemilu 2019 di Indonesia. Namun, dari hasil pemilu, ia hanya tampak 
signifikan di pemilu presiden, tidak di pemilu legislatif. Karena pemilu presiden dan legislatif dilaksanakan 
secara serentak, secara logika bisa diasumsikan apa yang signifikan dalam pemilu presiden akan signifikan 
juga dalam pemilu legislatif. Tulisan ini mencoba menjawab sejumlah pertanyaan. Benarkah penggunaan 
politik identitas meningkat? Mengapa ia hanya tampak signifikan dalam pemilu presiden dan tidak dalam 
pemilu legislatif? Bila politik identitas sangat penting, dengan asumsi yang menjadi targetnya adalah petahana, 
mengapa petahana masih keluar sebagai pemenang pemilu presiden? Apa saja implikasi hal ini terhadap 
demokrasi di Indonesia? Pembahasan dalam tulisan ini menggunakan sejumlah data, terutama survei nasional 
dan “exit poll”dari Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) dan  dari Lembaga Survei Indonesia 
(LSI). Kerangka teoritis untuk pembahasan didasarkan terutama pada teori-teori perilaku memilih dan politik 
identitas. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa politik identitas memang berperan signifikan, termasuk dengan 
cara menggunakan kabar palsu. Namun, dampak politik identitas dibatasi oleh faktor fundamental (seperti 
evaluasi pemilih terhadap kinerja petahana) sehingga tidak menjadi penentu hasil pemilu presiden. Karena sifat 
kompetisi di pemilu legislatif yang multipolar, politik identitas sulit untuk berperan signifikan. 
Kata kunci: faktor fundamental; kabar palsu; politik identitas
INTRODUCTION
The result of the 2019 Indonesian pre-
sidential election seems to show the importance 
of identity, particularly religion and ethnicity, in 
determining the partisan choices of the voters. 
The official result from the Indonesian General 
Election Commission (KPU) shows that Joko 
Widodo (Jokowi) was outperformed by his 
opponent, Prabowo Subianto (Prabowo), in the 
areas where the so-called political Islam is strong. 
Prabowo won, for instance, in the provinces of 
Aceh, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, West Java, 
Banten, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, 
and West Nusa Tenggara. On the other hand, 
Jokowi beat Prabowo in areas where Islam is 
considered more moderate or more pluralistic 
as well as in areas where the non-Muslim 
population is significant. For example, Jokowi 
won by a significant margin or landslide in the 
provinces of Lampung, Central Java, East Java, 
West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, North 
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Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara, and Papua. 
The result also shows that Jokowi won 
in the areas where Javanese ethnicity is pre-
dominant or significant. For example, in 
Sumatra, Jokowi won in North Sumatra and 
Lampung, two provinces which have significant 
Javanese populations. In Java, the Javanese 
are predominant in Central Java, East Java, 
and Yogyakarta, where Jokowi also won by 
landslides. On the other side, Prabowo carried 
West Java and Banten, where ethnic Sundanese 
are predominant, West Sumatra where the ethnic 
Minang are a majority, and Madura where the 
Madurese are the largest population.
First observations based on this result can 
lead to the impression that identity played an 
important role in the election. In other words, one 
could say that Indonesian voters are polarized 
along the lines of identity (religion and ethnicity) 
in the 2019 election. The more politically Islamic 
oriented and non-Javanese voters tended to vote 
for Prabowo while the less politically Islamic 
oriented and Javanese voters tended to vote for 
Jokowi. 
This observation seems less clear, however, 
if we compare the presidential with the legislative 
election result. If political Islam was significantly 
in play, we should expect that political support 
for Islamic political parties should also be rising, 
or at least be higher than the previous election. 
This is not the case, however. The total 
vote share for all Islamic parties is stagnant 
at the level of 30 percent, more or less. In the 
most recent previous elections (2009 and 2014), 
the total vote share for Islamic political parties 
is more or less the same. In addition, the vote 
share for other political parties is as fragmented 
as before. The vote share difference between the 
winner and the runner up is only about 6 percent, 
making it similar to the 2014 legislative election. 
The number of political parties which will be 
represented in parliament is now nine, only 
one party less than the 2014 legislative election 
result.
Given that the legislative and presidential 
elections are conducted concurrently, it is 
logical to assume that what is significant in the 
presidential election will also be significant for 
the legislative election. Identity politics, however, 
seems to be significant in the presidential but not 
the legislative election. Several questions are 
raised that need to be studied further. Is identity 
politics really rising? Why does it seem to be 
significant only in the presidential and not the 
legislative election? If identity politics in the 
presidential election is important, assuming that 
the incumbent is mostly the target of that politics, 
why did the incumbent still win? What are the 
implications of this for Indonesian democracy? 
This paper will answer, although briefly, these 
questions.
As summarized by Aspinall (2011), Fox and 
Menchik (2011), Mietzner (2019), Pepinsky et al. 
(2012), and Tanuwidjaja (2010), the importance 
of identity politics, particularly related to 
religion and ethnicity, in Indonesia, is widely 
acknowledged in the literature. Scholarship on 
this subject find that Indonesians are “devotedly 
religious and express their piety in diverse ways 
within social life” (Fox & Menchik, 2011, p. 3). 
As a consequence, the expression of identity, 
particularly religion, can be found both in 
political competition and in public policies, at 
the national and local levels. 
In electoral politics, at least until 2014, the 
role of identity politics, particularly Islam, is 
portrayed rather contradictive in the literature. 
On the one hand, particularly at the national 
level, Indonesian democracy is secularizing 
(Mujani & Liddle, 2009; Pepinsky et al., 2012). 
In this context secular politicians and political 
parties dominate the competition. The evidence 
for this is compelling; since democratic election 
was introduced in Indonesia in 1999, the total 
vote share received by four major Islamic parties 
(PKS, PPP, PKB, and PAN) has been decreasing 
or stagnant at the level of 30%. Comparing this 
result with the vote share of Islamic parties of 
the only democratic election before reformasi 
era (1955 election), the decrease of Islamic 
political parties’ support is even more clear 
because at the time Islamic parties could gain 
almost 50% of the total national votes. On the 
other hand, researches on local electoral politics 
find that identity, religion in the large part and 
ethnicity to a certain degree, is one important 
variable that can determine electoral outcomes 
(Baswedan, 2007). The importance of religion, 
particularly Islam, in local electoral politics gets 
even more attention because of its decisiveness 
in determining the outcome of the 2017 Jakarta’s 
gubernatorial election (Romli, 2019). 
The analysis of the importance of 
identity politics in national electoral politics 
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started to be more available since the election 
of 2014 and 2019, as in these two elections the 
issue of religion was played out widely by the 
contestants and supporters of the candidates 
in the elections (Fossati, 2019; Mietzner, 
2019). Most of these analyses however, 
focus on the salience of identity namely how 
identity politics was played out and to what 
extent it is played out in electoral politics. 
This paper will contribute to this debate by 
adding an element of the decisiveness of 
identity politics in determining the result of 
election. This paper will add an argument 
that identity politics can be played out, but 
whether or not it will make the one who play 
it victorious or not depends on several factors 
such as fundamental factors and the context 
of the electoral competition. 
The discussion will be based on data, 
particularly surveys and exit polls, which were 
conducted by the Saiful Mujani Research and 
Consulting (SMRC) and the Indonesian Survey 
Institute, the English term for Lembaga Survei 
Indonesia (LSI), during this national election 
cycle. Theoretical guidance for the discussion 
will be mainly based on the voting behavior and 
identity politics literature. 
METHOD
Data of the present study were drawn 
from 18 national surveys conducted by SMRC 
between 2015 and 2019 and an exit poll of the 
2019 Indonesian General Election conducted 
by SMRC and LSI. The sample size of the 18 
national surveys was between 988 respondents 
(the smallest) and 2479 (the largest). Each sample 
in these national surveys was representative of 
the characteristics of Indonesian national voters’ 
population. By law, Indonesian voter is defined as 
a person who has reached the age of 17 years old 
or has got married. 
Each sample was taken from the population 
by using exactly the same methods of multistage 
random sampling. The process of sampling 
was as follows. The primary sampling unit 
of the surveys was village (desa/kelurahan). 
First, the villages at the level of provinces and 
or electoral districts were randomly selected 
proportionally. Second, in each of the village 
selected, five neighborhood association (RT) 
were randomly selected. Third, in each selected 
RT, two households were randomly selected. 
Finally, from each of the household one 
respondent (male/female) was selected. If from 
one household the female was selected, from 
the next household one male respondent was 
selected. The respondent was interviewed face 
to face by a trained surveyor. Certain questions 
in the surveys were the same from one survey 
to another, especially about public evaluation on 
government performance, on general condition 
such as economy, politics, security, democracy, 
etc., and in our case also about identity politics.
Exit poll is actually a kind of survey with the 
same method. The difference is that the primary 
sampling unit is not the village but the polling 
station (TPS). Exit poll is a method of survey by 
asking questions to a person who just gets out of 
a polling station. SMRC and LSI conducted an 
exit poll during the day of election of April 17, 
2019. The sample size was 3000 TPS, randomly 
selected from 813.350 total TPS across the 
country. The TPS were first grouped based on 
national electoral districts for national parliament 
(DPR) and also based on rural and urban divide. 
From each of these electoral districts, the TPS 
were randomly selected proportionally until 
the number reach 3000 TPS. From each TPS, 
one respondent was selected randomly based 
on the timing he/she got out of the TPS. The 
selected respondent was then interviewed by a 
trained surveyor face to face. In an exit poll, the 
questions were mainly about the reasons of why 
voters voted the way they did. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This section shows and discusses the 
findings of the study with regard to identity 
politics, and fundamental factors and the salience 
of identity as well as its limitation. 
Is Identity Politics Rising?
In this paper identity politics is understood 
as the utilization of identity as “…a useful tool 
for mobilizing people, policing boundaries, and 
building coalitions that can be deployed in the 
struggle for power...” (Eifert et al., 2010, p. 494). 
In other words, identity politics is the utilization 
of any identity by persons or groups against their 
opponents in the efforts of winning the political 
power competition like in elections. Two types of 
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identity – ethnicity and religion – are among the 
most powerful motivators of political behavior, 
making them very important in identity politics 
(Abranjo, et al., 2001; Berman & Laitin, 2008; 
Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004). 
An exit poll result describes Indonesian 
voters as polarized along religious and ethnic 
lines when the question is about presidential 
choice. This is in line with the observation offered 
at the beginning of this paper. The following 
table describes this in more detail.
Table 1. 2019 Presidential Support Based on Identity 
and Religious Organization
     Source: SMRC & LSI Exit Poll, April 2019
Category Jokowi - Amin (%)
Prabowo - Sandi 
(%)
Ethnicity   
Javanese 67 33
Sundanese 36 64
Batak 65 35
Minang 10 90
Betawi 32 68
Madurese 42 58
Buginese 46 54
Religion   
Muslim 50 50
Christian 96 4
Others 98 2
Religious 
Organization   
NU 60 40
Muhammadiyah 35 65
Others 30 70
The connection between ethnicity and 
presidential choice is shown clearly. The data 
in table 1 above show that a strong majority 
of Javanese (67%) voted for Jokowi, while 
only 33% chose Prabowo. The support 
from the Javanese ethnic group is the most 
important in this regard because this ethnic 
group makes up more than 40% of the total 
Indonesian population. On the other hand, 
among the second largest ethnic group, 
Sundanese, support is overwhelmingly for 
Prabowo (64%), with only 36% for Jokowi. 
Because the Sundanese are only about 16% of 
the population, however, this big win does not 
make up for Prabowo’s loss to Jokowi among 
the Javanese. \
Jokowi was also supported overwhelmingly 
by the Batak ethnic group (65%) compared to 
Prabowo (35%). Meanwhile, Prabowo was 
supported also with a strong majority by the 
Minang (90%), Betawi (68%), Madurese (58%), 
and Buginese (54%) ethnic groups. Simply 
put, the Javanese were for Jokowi, while the 
non-Javanese, except for the Bataks, were for 
Prabowo in the 2019 presidential election. 
Similar polarization can be seen along 
religious lines through this exit poll. About 96% 
of the Protestants and Catholics voted for Jokowi. 
Similarly, about 98% of the other non-Muslim 
groups also voted for Jokowi. In other words, 
non-Muslims were for Jokowi. Among the 
Muslim group, the vote was evenly distributed, 
50% for Jokowi and 50% for Prabowo. There 
was seemingly no polarization based on these 
numbers. 
However, when we narrow down the 
categorization among Muslims, we can see 
a similar pattern of polarization. Indonesian 
Muslims can also be categorized based on their 
affiliation with Islamic movement organizations 
such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 
Persatuan Islam (Persis), etc. Jokowi was supported 
overwhelmingly by NU-affiliated Muslims 
(60%) compared to Prabowo (40%). But the non-
NU affiliated Muslims were overwhelmingly for 
Jokowi’s opponent.  Prabowo was supported by 
65% of Muhammadiyah members and 70% of 
other Islamic organization members. 
NU-affiliated Muslims are the largest 
group among Indonesian Muslims. According 
to SMRC’s national survey of November 2016, 
this group makes up about 50% of Indonesian 
Muslims. In general, NU-affiliated Muslims 
are considered more attached to Indonesian 
traditional ways of life (and called traditionalists) 
and are less political. Sometimes, their Islamic 
religious value and practice are considered more 
relaxed. On the other hand, the non-NU affiliated 
Muslims, like Muhammadiyah and others, tend 
to be more modernist in their religiosity and are 
usually more attached to political Islam. In other 
words, less politically Islamic groups were for 
Jokowi, while more politically Islamic groups 
were for Prabowo. 
These categories of religious and ethnic 
lines are overlapping. NU affiliated Muslims 
are overwhelmingly Javanese while non-NU 
affiliated Muslims are overwhelmingly non-
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Javanese. This identity polarization is a good 
indicator that identity politics is actually in play 
in the election. 
The narratives and issues in the election 
campaign provide clues about the utilization of 
identity-related issues to portray one candidate 
as closer or not closer to a given identity and the 
other candidate on the opposing side. The data 
from the same exit poll mentioned above also 
describes this clearly.
One issue is about Jokowi as a communist. 
This issue can be connected to identity because 
communist is equal to atheist in Indonesia. An 
atheist must be against religion, particularly 
Islam. This issue has been in public actually 
since the election of 2014, when Jokowi was 
running for his first term. Up to April 2019, the 
data show that almost half of the Indonesian 
electorate (44%) was exposed to this issue 
(SMRC, 2019). This means that this issue has 
been widely reported and is well known to the 
public. 
Another related issue is that Jokowi is a 
Chinese puppet. The identity element of this issue 
is clear. Portraying Jokowi as not only friendly 
to but also working for the Chinese will clearly 
put him on the opposing side of the Indonesian 
public in general, given that the Chinese minority 
is sometimes in a tense relationship with other 
groups. Up to April 2019, this issue has been 
widely known by about 36% of the electorate. 
The third most relevant issue is that Jokowi 
is anti-Islam. In April 2019, about 34% of the 
electorate was exposed to this narrative. From the 
identity politics perspective, those three issues are 
connected and strengthen each other in an effort 
to portray Jokowi as a candidate who is on the 
opposing side and even a threat to the Indonesian 
public whose identity is predominantly religious 
and particularly Muslim. 
Do these electoral phenomena of identity 
politics have a deeper basis in Indonesian society 
in general? Longitudinal survey data from five 
national surveys in the period of 2017-2019 
(SMRC, 2017, 2018, 2019, in press) confirm 
that they do. The mobilization of identity for 
political purposes, particularly religion, will not 
have resonance in the public if there is no belief 
that it is important (Fearon, 2006; Hatina, 2007; 
Nicholson, 2008; Parekh, 2008). 
One way to look at this is by examining 
the level of people’s willingness or tolerance for 
the possibility of being led (in public life) by a 
leader whose religion is from a minority group. 
SMRC and LSI have longitudinal data about the 
so-called “anti-non-Muslim leader” sentiment 
among the Muslim group. In general, the findings 
show that there is an increase in this sentiment, 
especially since Jokowi ran for president in the 
previous election.
In a national survey of April 2019 
(SMRC, 2019), it was found that a majority of 
the Indonesian electorate (52%) believe that 
Muslims may not be led by a non-Muslim (as 
mayor, district head, governor, vice president, 
president). This number is higher than the 
finding from May 2017 (46%). Relating this to 
the 2019 presidential election, this sentiment was 
highest among Muslims (57%) and in the areas 
where Prabowo won the race such as Sumatra 
(58%), West Java (68%), and Banten (67%). 
The sentiment was lower in the areas where 
Jokowi won the race such as East Java (43%), 
Kalimantan (41%), Bali and Nusa Tenggara 
(31%), or Maluku and Papua (21%). Similarly, 
the sentiment was higher among ethnic groups 
that supported Prabowo and lower among ethnic 
groups that supported Jokowi. 
Looking at this sentiment more closely 
among Muslim voters and also with more 
specific levels of leadership (mayor, governor, 
vice president, president), the data show three 
patterns. First, there is an increase of this 
sentiment for all levels of leadership. Second, the 
higher the level of office of leadership, the higher 
the sentiment. Third, specific to the presidential 
office, this sentiment was always high at 50% 
or more, even during the time when sentiment 
against other levels of leadership was low. 
The sentiment against non-Muslim mayors/
heads of districts was very low in January 2008 
(41%). 46% said they did not mind if a non-
Muslim becomes mayor or district head. This 
sentiment was even lower in March 2016 (39%). 
But starting from November 2016 until August 
2017, it rose to 50%, and became even higher 
after that. In April 2019, the sentiment was high 
at 58%. 
A similar pattern also applies to the 
sentiment against non-Muslim governors.  That 
sentiment was low at 42% in January 2008, but 
high at 60% in April 2019. The sentiment against 
a non-Muslim vice president was also low in 
March 2016 (41%), but high at 62% in April 
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2019. Even higher is the sentiment against a non-
Muslim president. It was at the level of 48% in 
January 2008. But starting from November 2016 
this sentiment rose to 60% on average, reaching 
the highest level in April 2019 (66%). 
The increase of this anti-non-Muslim 
leader sentiment provide more fertile ground 
for the rise of identity politics. The fact, as far 
as the data goes, that there are similar patterns 
of the distribution of partisan choice with the 
distribution of identity and the rise of anti-non-
Muslim leaders, is a clear indication that identity 
politics is rising and played an important role in 
the last presidential election. 
Given that the 2019 election was a concurrent 
election, this raises the question of why identity 
politics does not seem to be clearly reflected in 
the legislative election. The best indicator for 
the rise of identity politics, particularly related 
to Islam, in a legislative election, should be the 
increase of partisan support for Islamic political 
parties. The total partisan support for five Islamic 
parties which competed in the election is only 
about 30%, however. This number has not 
changed significantly since the election of 2004. 
It has been stagnant during the last fifteen years 
of democratized Indonesia.
One way to understand this is by looking 
at how identity politics can play an important 
role in a competition like an election. Identity, 
particularly religion and ethnicity, can be a 
powerful motivator or driver of social and 
political behavior (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; 
Hechter, 1978; Humphreys, 2008). To enable 
it to become a significant tool in a political 
competition like an election, however, at least 
two conditions have to be present (Eifert, et al., 
2010). 
First, that the identity in question is perceived 
to be at stake. There is a widespread feeling, 
for instance, that one identity is threatened by 
another to the extent that a certain identity can 
suffer great loss through political competition. 
The election itself is often viewed as an arena 
where identity is at stake. Clear polarization 
between two competitors in head to head (bipolar 
competition) elections can also be considered as 
a situation that puts identity at stake. The second 
condition is that the competition or election is 
competitive or closely fought. The winner can 
only be winning by a small margin against the 
opponent. 
In the Indonesian case, the presence of these 
two conditions was weaker in the legislative 
election and relatively stronger in the presidential 
election of 2019. Unlike the presidential election, 
the competition in the legislative election was 
multipolar, not bipolar (head to head). In this 
kind of competition, it is difficult to portray one 
or more political parties as being for one religion 
while others are not. It would be even more 
difficult to portray more than twenty thousand 
legislative candidates as being for one identity 
or another. The sense of specific identities being 
threatened was relatively absent. 
As described in the data on sentiment against 
non-Muslim leaders above, the higher the office 
and the fewer the number of offices available, 
the higher the level of sentiment. This implies 
that the stakes are higher in the competition 
for higher and fewer offices. In the case of the 
presidential office, the stakes are the highest. 
Legislative seats are clearly not the highest 
office. In addition, legislative seats are abundant. 
In every legislative election, the number of 
seats that are up for grabs is more than twenty 
thousand in total at all levels of municipality/
district, province, and the national legislature. 
In other words, the sense of identity being at 
stake is not as strong in the legislative election. 
Similarly, the sense of a very competitive and 
close election was also not there. Thus, identity 
seems not to be significantly in play here.
The comparatively less significant impor-
tance of identity in the legislative than the 
presidential election also implies that identity 
politics was more related to the heated rivalry or 
deep polarization between Jokowi and Prabowo. 
This means that even if the context is similar, if 
the competition is not between these two, the 
state of the race could be different. 
Fundamental Factors and the Salience of 
Identity: Why Does the Incumbent Still Win?
If identity was rising and was significantly 
in play in the 2019 presidential election, 
how then could Jokowi pull it off and end the 
race a winner? Can fundamental factors and 
incumbency explain the victory of Jokowi? 
One could say that even if there is a strong 
incumbent, identity politics could be the winning 
factor for whoever utilizes it. The well-known 
example of this is the Jakarta gubernatorial 
election of February and April of 2017. The 
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strong incumbent was decisively defeated by 
the contender who directly or indirectly utilized 
identity politics along religious and ethnic lines. 
Both identity and fundamental factors 
are considered important by voting behavior 
theorists in explaining partisan choice in elections 
(Dowding, 2018; Evans & Northmore-Ball, 
2018; Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018; Mujani 
et al., 2011; Mujani et al., 2018). Incumbency 
(presidential approval ratings), general economic 
condition, general security condition, and 
government performance in various sectors of 
public life, are among important fundamental 
factors that can determine the likelihood of an 
incumbent to get reelected. Sociological factors 
can also be important because voters can be 
motivated by their religion, ethnicity, class, etc. 
to make a decision as to who they are going to 
vote for in an election.
The literature on voting behavior in general 
suggests that fundamental factors are the most 
powerful predictors of the election whenever 
an incumbent is running for re-election. When 
fundamental factors are good or positive, the 
voters tend to re-elect the incumbent. When the 
fundamental factors are negative, the incumbent 
will face difficulties and potentially lose to 
the contender. Identity politics, as mentioned 
above, however, can be a challenge even if the 
incumbent enjoys good fundamentals.
The two conditions that can enable identity 
politics to play out significantly (Eifert, et al., 
2010) seem to be present in the presidential 
election. First, the competition was head to head, 
thus, competitive and polarized. The polarization 
had been there since 2014 because 2019 was 
actually a rematch between the two candidates. 
Second, the competition is for the highest 
office in the country, so the stakes are high. 
This resonated with the phenomenon of high 
sentiment regarding anti-non-Muslim leaders as 
mentioned above. 
But the second condition was not clearly 
present, that is the widespread feeling that 
identity, in this circumstance, Islam, was 
under threat. This condition will usually be 
automatically there when a candidate from one 
identity is facing a candidate from the opposing 
identity. In the Indonesian context this should be 
a Muslim versus a non-Muslim candidate. In the 
2019 presidential election this was not the case. 
Both candidates were Muslim and therefore 
there was no objective or direct evidence that 
Islam was in danger when the incumbent was re-
elected. It would be much easier for the opponent 
of Jokowi to say that he was the threat to Islam 
if he was non-Muslim. His religious identity was 
not synchronous with the narrative against him.
But identity can be constructed or manipulated 
(Habyarimana, et al., 2007; Posner, 2004). 
Through social manipulation or construction, 
person or group can be portrayed (by themselves 
or by others) as part of certain identity despite the 
fact that the person or group is actually not part 
of that certain identity. Here the role of hoaxes 
and fake news is important. Three main fake 
news items or hoaxes mentioned above (Jokowi 
is the puppet of China, Jokowi is a communist, 
and Jokowi is anti-Islam) are wide-spread and 
known to the public. These three fake news items 
are clearly part of an effort to create or construct 
a new identity for Jokowi, namely that he is a 
threat to Muslims and Islam. 
In fact, hoaxes and fake news are wide-
spread phenomena during this election cycle. The 
Ministry of Communication and Information 
(KOMINFO) of the Republic of Indonesia in its 
report stated that from August 2018 through June 
2019 there were 2,370 hoaxes or fake news items 
circulated among the public (Kominfo, 2018, 
2019, in press). During the months approaching 
the election, the number of fake news items was 
the highest. The peak was in March, April, and 
May of 2019 with the number of fake news 
items at 453, 501, and 402 consecutively.
The largest number of fake news items are 
about politics (753), followed by government 
issues (268), health issues (254), and religion 
(118). Many of these fake news items were related 
to identity issues. To provide a few examples, 
here are some identity-related fake news items, as 
reported by KOMINFO:
“Jokowi made official the use of a Jesus 
Christ statue in Toraja”
“Teten Masduki confirmed that the 
presidential staff office was often used for 
PKI meetings as instructed by Jokowi”
“Jokowi: “PKI is not guilty and not a threat; 
radical Islam is the threat!”
“Advisors in the presidential palace are 
members of the Chinese Communist Party”
“So, now you know that Jokowi’s regime is 
anti-Islam”
22 Identity Politics in the 2019 Indonesian General Elections: its Significance and Limitation
“Viral!! Thousands of Chinese foreign 
workers finally revealed themselves to the 
public”
“Ahok will be the vice president, then 
president”
“Police chief: PKI is not a threat to the state 
compared to Islam”
“Revealed: Jokowi’s original name was 
Herbertus Handoko Joko Widodo bin Oey 
Hong Liong”
“Fact: the current president is actually a 
Christian. And the current government is 
controlled by Christians”
The examples above are only a few of 
the many fake news items distributed among 
the public through mainly social media and 
non-mainstream online media. The bottom line 
was clear: it was a massive effort to portray the 
incumbent as anti-Islam, a communist, and the 
puppet of China. The combination of these three 
elements is enough to portray the incumbent as 
someone whose identity is a threat to a majority 
of Indonesians. 
Was there fake news about Jokowi’s 
opponent or Prabowo? Yes, there was. However, 
the numbers seem very low compared to the 
fake news about the incumbent. For example, 
there was fake news that stated: “Prabowo is a 
worshipper of the tomb” (meaning not a pure 
Muslim). In other words, fake news seemed to 
target mainly Jokowi both as president as well 
as candidate.
The effectiveness of fake news in con-
structing fake identity for the incumbent 
depended very much on the extent to which that 
information was believed by the public. Public 
opinion data found that the influence of this 
fake news on the public is limited. It was widely 
heard but only a few believed it was true. From 
the exit polls mentioned above, among the 44% 
of the public who were exposed to the issue 
that Jokowi was a member of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI), only 18% believed it 
and 70% did not believe. Among 36% of the 
members of the public who were exposed to the 
issue that Jokowi is the puppet of China, only 
32% believed it. Similarly, 34% of the public 
was aware of the issue that Jokowi is anti-Islam, 
but only 18% of this 34% believed that it is true. 
The level of influence of identity-related 
fake news, especially about the incumbent, 
has been stagnant at this low level during 
Jokowi’s presidency. From nine national surveys 
conducted by SMRC between September 2017 
and April 2019 (before election day), members 
of the public who believe that Jokowi is a 
communist was stagnant at 5-6%, while only 
between 3-6% believe that Jokowi is anti-Islam. 
A slightly higher number of voters believe that 
Jokowi is a Chinese puppet, but that number is 
also stagnant at the level of 6-13%. 
This data description leads us to say that 
the use of identity related issues, particularly the 
ones distributed by using fake news, although 
having some effect, has been limited in its role 
in making identity, particularly religion, a factor 
that was at stake in this election. Identity was 
salient, but not to the extent that it became the 
most important deciding factor. 
Other than the non-existence of two 
opposing identities, several other factors also 
possibly limit the influence of fake identity news. 
One is the fact that the electorate has been much 
more familiar with the incumbent compared to 
the 2014 election. Jokowi was not as mysterious 
as in 2014 when he was still nobody not only 
among members of the public but also among 
the national political elites. It would be more 
difficult to promote successfully falsehoods 
about somebody when he/she is widely known. 
Another factor could be the choice of 
Jokowi’s running mate: Ma’ruf Amin. He is well-
known as a very senior and respected Islamic 
scholar who has been leading the Indonesian 
Ulama Council (MUI), the umbrella organization 
for Islamic scholars nationally. Ma’ruf Amin is 
also known as an important leader of the NU 
organization. His view of Islam is considered 
conservative making him also friendly to more 
conservative Muslim voters. His selection was 
mainly regarded as a way to provide a protective 
cover for Jokowi against identity-based attacks 
from those more politically Islamic groups 
which were attached to Jokowi’s contender. This 
strategy seemed to work since it would have 
been very difficult, for instance, to label Jokowi 
as anti-Islam while his running mate is the chief 
of the ulama (Islamic scholars).
When other important factors such as 
identity are not dominant, voting behavior 
theory states that fundamental factors should 
be considered when an election involves an 
incumbent. All these factors during Jokowi’s 
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administration were at least not against him, if 
not working in his favor. 
In SMRC’s national tracking surveys during 
the last three years of Jokowi’s presidency since 
June 2016 until one week before the election, 
his approval ratings have been stable at the level 
of above 60% to 70%. For comparison, with a 
similar level of approval ratings, the previous 
president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), 
won by more than 60% of the vote in his re-
election bid in 2009. Consistent with his approval 
ratings, people were also confident that Jokowi 
has the leadership skills to bring Indonesia to a 
higher quality of life. On average, about 70% of 
the public trust his leadership capacity. 
Other fundamental factors, particularly 
the economy and security, were also evaluated 
positively by the public. The number of voters 
who regarded the economy as better than last 
year has always been higher than those who 
said that the economy was worse than last 
year. This positive evaluation has been stable 
since December 2015. This positive economy 
evaluation was consistent with the low level of 
inflation until April 2019. Low level of inflation 
has been also consistently translated into positive 
evaluations of the economy. 
The same applies to security evaluation. 
People’s evaluation of their security condition 
has been very positive since September 2005, 
including during all the years of Jokowi’s 
presidency up to election day. With the exception 
of several aspects of daily life, people’s 
evaluations of government performance in 
various sectors were also mostly positive. The 
most positive were evaluations of infrastructure, 
education, and healthcare. But the public’s 
evaluation of several aspects of daily life such 
as job creation, the price of nine basic goods, 
and unemployment was neither positive nor 
negative. Nevertheless, all in all, people felt very 
good about the incumbent across various sectors 
of government programs. 
In short, the less-effective utilization of 
identity politics, coupled with strong incumbency 
and positive fundamental factors have together 
enabled Jokowi to be victorious despite the 
fact that the competition had been not only 
competitive but also polarized/divisive. This is 
reflected in the voters’ main reasons to support 
the incumbent or the contender. According to 
exit polls mentioned above, the incumbent’s 
performance as shown by his programs became 
the main reason to vote for him (46%), followed 
by family choice (14%), because he is close 
to and fights for the people (19%), and his 
campaign advertisements and attractiveness 
(9%). Similarly, the program promises became 
the main reasons for Prabowo’s voters to support 
him (40%), followed by family choice (15%), 
campaign attractiveness (12%), and he fights for 
the people (8%). There is a significant number 
of voters who supported him because of religion 
(7%), compared to Jokowi (2%), a clue that 
identity politics was also in play.
CONCLUSION
This analysis shows that the utilization of 
identity, particularly ethnicity and religion, was 
widespread in 2019 Indonesian general election. 
This is possible and attractive to political players 
because the sentiment of identity politics among 
the voters has been rising during the last five 
years leading up to the election, as confirmed 
by the surveys data (both from SMRC and LSI). 
The use of identity politics in this election was 
also facilitated by the very competitive (closely 
fought and head to head competition) nature of 
presidential election. However, identity politics 
was not significantly in play in legislative 
election because of the multipolar nature of that 
election. In multipolar competition, it is difficult 
to play one identity against another. 
Although identity politics was widely used in 
presidential election, its effect has been limited 
by two factors. First, fundamental factors such 
as incumbent’s approval ratings and public 
evaluation on economy and incumbent’s per-
formance, were all in favor of the incumbent. 
Second, there was no clear identity different 
between the incumbent and his opponent, 
because both of them are more or less from 
the same religious and ethnicity backgrounds, 
making it difficult to convince enough voters 
that one candidate is the threat to certain identity. 
These two factors made the effect of identity 
politics was limited and difficult to be a decisive 
factor in the election. 
How is the phenomenon of identity politics in 
2019 Indonesian elections affected or connected 
to the state of democracy in the country? 
Indonesian commitment and support (preference) 
for democracy in general has always been at the 
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level of moderate to high, amidst the signals of 
the rise of identity politics as described above. 
The trend of this preference has been rising, 
especially during Jokowi’s presidency. SMRC’s 
national survey of April 2019 found that 78% of 
the public regard democracy as the best political 
system for the country compared to others. 
This number is higher than in June 2015 when 
Jokowi was still in his first year, and also higher 
than in June 2012 (56%), before Jokowi ran for 
the presidency. 
This trend is similar to the trend in people’s 
satisfaction with the practice of democracy. 
In general, satisfaction with the practice of 
democracy is influenced by governmental 
performance in the economy, security, political 
stability, and law enforcement. Since the 
beginning of Jokowi’s presidency, there has 
been a trend that people’s satisfaction with the 
practice of democracy is rising. In October 
2014, for instance, this satisfaction was at the 
level of 60%, increasing to 65%, and then 74% 
in various national tracking surveys from 2014 
through April 2019 (SMRC, 2019). 
In other words, there are indications that 
democracy and the practice of democracy are 
getting stronger in the eyes of the Indonesian 
public. Interestingly, perhaps unfortunately, 
however, as displayed by evidence from the 2019 
general election, this increasing preference for 
democracy is coupled with increasing political 
intolerance. This is indicated by the increase in 
sentiment against non-Muslim leaders among 
Muslims as discussed in the previous section. 
As the increase of political intolerance can be a 
fertile ground for identity politics, we could say 
that Indonesian democracy in the near future is 
prone to the challenge of religious and ethnic 
politics or identity politics in general. 
The survey results and analysis discussed above 
also imply that the identity politics challenge is 
clear and can be salient or break through under 
certain conditions. Hopefully, however, this 
challenge can still be managed successfully as 
long as the general conditions of the economy, 
political stability, security, and people’s daily 
lives are still positive. Since the ground for 
identity politics is fertile, the challenge for 
Indonesians is how to avoid or prevent the two 
conditions that place identity politics in play: 
head to head competition and the widespread 
feeling that an identity is under threat. There 
must be more effort or even government policies 
adopted to prevent the widespread feeling or 
narrative that one’s religion and/or ethnicity is 
under threat from another identity.
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